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I. Introduction 
 
Cabs have been regulated in London since the 17th century and the current system has been in 
place since the 19th century,2 although most of the current applicable provisions date back 
from 1934. In 2017, the taxi and private hire (“PH”) market in London represented ca. 
150,000 drivers, i.e. nearly 40 % of the overall 356,000 licenced drivers on the English 
market. Only a few years before, in 2011, there were only 77,000 taxis and PH drivers 
throughout England.3 The market has more than quadrupled in six years as new technology 
and new actors (Uber, Gett, mytaxi (formerly Hailo), Addison Lee, Kabbee etc.) have deeply 
changed how taxis and PH are used in London and in England as anywhere else in the world.   
 
However, London is not just any place in the world. Among its distinctive features, stand its 
iconic black cabs and its regulatory system stands out. Indeed, very few aspects of the market 
are regulated. The quality of taxi drivers, the standards of vehicles and fares are subject to 
regulation mainly. However, the number of taxis is not limited, and taxis have no monopoly: 
besides taxis, PH has been operating since the 1960s and regulated since 1998. Therefore, the 
market is left largely unregulated regarding the outcomes themselves.  
 
Digital platforms such as Uber are often presented as a “disruption” of the old business 
models.4 Fears are expressed that an “unregulated market”5 would ensue which would cause 
security problems for its users. In 2017, the saga around the renewal of Uber’s licence in 
London has however shown that Uber does not escape regulation. The stakes of these 
                                               
1 Enguerrand Marique: UCLouvain, CRIDES, PhD Candidate (enguerrand.marique@uclouvain.be); member of 
the Research Observatory on the Sharing Economy, Law and Society (www.rosels.eu); Yseult Marique: 
University of Essex, Senior Lecturer; FöV Speyer, Research Associate (ymarique@essex.ac.uk). All Internet 
links were last consulted on February 2018. 
2 Starting with the London Hackney Carriage Act 1831. See L. Butcher, Taxi and private hire vehicle licensing 
in England and Wales, (House of Commons Library, SNO2005, 14 December 2017), p. 5. 
3 DfT, Taxis and private hire vehicles – Statistics, 2011. 
4 Butcher, above (2) p. 39; London Assembly Transport Committee, Future proof: Taxi and private hire 
services in London, 16 December 2014, 3.17; House of Lords, Gig economy: Introduction, 21 November 2017, 
p. 8. 
5 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/13/uber-cabbie-protest-sharing-economy.  
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tensions are of a different nature. Uber and similar digital platforms foster “regulatory 
brands”:6 They require their drivers to comply with a range of their own requirements, so 
that they develop a private regulation of the market. For instance, they can determine fares 
through their own algorithm instead of a taximeter applying publicly regulated tariffs; they 
may seek to compel drivers to drive below their actual costs or accept pooled journeys etc. 
Hence tensions between London and Uber. 
  
The war7 between London and Uber is only starting: a range of changes – such as the 
deregulation of taxis or the capping of PH licences – are called by some actors and resisted 
by other ones at the highest level.8 However, by 2017, the major pillars of the regulatory 
system in London have remained in place. Only marginal changes (e.g. tweaking existing 
regulations9 or reinterpreting legal concepts) have been carried out and the enforcement of 
existing regulation has been enhanced. Most of these changes have been justified by the need 
to raise the standards in the PH industry, improve safety and enhance customers’ 
convenience.10 
 
This paper is structured as follow. The second section examines the legal framework in place 
to regulate taxis and PH services in London. The third section analyses which legal questions 
Uber made arise in relation to the transport of individuals,11 as intermediated by digital 
platforms when it arrived in London. The fourth section briefly mentions the situation in 
England outside London. The fifth section then overviews the main changes under 
consideration in England. Finally, the conclusion suggests that the disruption caused by Uber 
is not so much of a regulatory nature than of a social and financial nature. The reader will 
find in appendix statistics helping to better grasp the scope of the changes on the market of 
taxis and PH services in London and England between 2011 and 2017. 
 
II. The legal framework: taxis and PH in London 
 
Origins. Dating back from the mi-19th century, two distinct types of legislation regulate taxis 
in England: one exclusively applicable to London and one applicable to the rest of England.12 
When it comes to London, the first relevant Acts were passed in 184713 and 1869.14 At 
around the same time appeared the Knowledge test, the test that taxi drivers have to succeed 
to obtain their licence. In the course of the following years, legislation was amended a few 
times; the most structural change being the London Cab Order 1934. Finally, PH developed 
                                               
6 K. Niemietz and D. Zuluaga, Hire authority - Turning statutory regulation into private regulation for the UK’s 
taxi industry, Discussion Paper No.76, Institute of Economic Affairs, October 2016, p. 9. 
7 See the title from a 2017 Financial Times article: “How Uber and London ended up in a taxi war” (September 
28, 2017). 
8 E.g.: Prime Minister Theresa May (Conservative) and London Mayor Sadiq Khan (Labour) disagree on Uber 
(see e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/28/uber-licence-withdrawal-disproportionate-says-
theresa-may ). 
9 The main recent changes since 2016 are listed on TfL website (https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-
hire/new-private-hire-regulations ). 
10 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/new-private-hire-regulation.  
11 Further referred as ‘customers’ when discussing the relationship with the drivers or ‘users’ when discussing 
the relationship with the platform.  
12 Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have different regulatory frameworks. In Wales, the same system 
applies as in England but a differentiated system is possible since the Wales Act 2017 (s 28). In Northern 
Ireland, the Taxis Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 applies. In Scotland, the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, 
part II applies (http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/law/Licensing/taxiphc).  
13 Town Police Clauses Act 1847. 
14 Metropolitan Carriage Act 1869. 
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in London in the 1960s and was regulated by the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 
(PHV Act). 
 
This section describes the two-tier system in place in London (2.1), the licensing discretion in 
assessing the “fit and proper person” test (2.2), other regulatory powers enjoyed by the 
London licencing authority (2.3) and the enforcement system (2.4). It then recaps the main 
differences between taxis and PH in London (2.5).  
1.1. A two-tier system: the devil is in the detail 
2.1.1 London Mayor. In London, the legislation provides that the Mayor has a specific duty 
regarding transport,15 adopting for instance an overall transport strategy16 and a policy 
relating to taxis and PH. The Mayor can thus determine his/her priorities regarding mobility, 
public space,17 taxis and PH.18 For instance, Mayor Sadiq Khan emphasises as key priorities 
safety in the sector as well as the development of the “greenest taxi fleet in the world”.19 This 
comes within the background of major pollution issues in London, where EU emissions 
levels are regularly breached.20  
Transport for London. The major actor of the transport policy in London is Transport for 
London (“TfL”),21 chaired by the London Mayor. It runs most of London public transport 
services (Underground, buses, the Docklands Light Railway, Overground, London trams, 
London River Services, London Dial-a-Ride, etc). It has thus an oversight over the different 
transport modes and seeks to ensure mobility in London, preventing congestion and traffic 
jam. TfL is a very well equipped and resourced body, including over 27.000 staff22 and a 
£10,2bn budget (for 2017-18).23 It is in particular in charge of major infrastructure projects 
such as Crossrail (a key development of the London underground), which is currently one of 
the largest infrastructures in Europe with a budget of £14,8 bn.24  
 
TfL (more precisely, a unit known as “London Taxi and Private Hire”) exercises licensing 
functions for taxis and PH, working as a two-tier system, which means that there is no taxi 
monopoly. This system works as follows. 
2.1.2 Taxis (also known as “hackney carriages” or “black cabs”) – Definitions. 
Technically, the legislation regulates “hackney carriages”. The Metropolitan Carriage Act 
1869 defines them as “any carriage for the conveyance of passengers which plies for hire 
                                               
15 S 141 Greater London Authority Act 1999: “(1)The Mayor shall develop and implement policies for the 
promotion and encouragement of safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and services to, 
from and within Greater London.” 
16 S 142 Greater London Authority Act 1999; Mayor of London, Draft mayor's transport strategy, 2017 
(https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/how-we-work/planning-for-the-future/the-mayors-transport-strategy).  
17 E.g.: Mayor of London and TfL, Healthy streets for London – Prioritising walking, cycling and public 
transport to create a healthy city, 2017.  
18 E.g.: Mayor of London and TfL, Taxi and private hire action plan, 2016.  
19 Ibid., esp. p. 11. See also former Mayor Johnson policy priorities in The Queen on the Application of Core 
Issues Trust Ldt v. TfL and The Mayor of London [2014] EWHC 2628 (Admin). 
20 European Commission, “Commission warns Germany, France, Spain, Italy and United Kingdom of continued 
air pollution breaches”, Press Release IP/17/238, 15 February 2017; European Commission, “February 
infringement package: key decisions”, Fact Sheet, 15 February 2017, Memo/17/234.  
21 On TfL, see s 154 sq Greater London Authority Act 1999. 
22 TfL, Annual workforce monitoring report, 2015/16. 
23 TfL, Budget 2017-18, p. 6. 
24 http://www.crossrail.co.uk/news/crossrail-in-numbers . 
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within the limits of this Act, and is neither a stage carriage nor a tramcar”.25 The first Act to 
mention “taxi” was the Transport Act 1980, that defined them by reference to vehicles 
licensed under the Metropolitan Carriage Act 1869. In 2014, the Law Commission 
recommended to streamline the use of taxi throughout the whole legislation as the term 
'hackney carriages' bears no relevance today.26 Concretely, the legislation requires two 
licences: one for the taxi driver and one for the taxi vehicle. 
 
Taxi driver’s licence. To be licensed as a taxi driver, the applicant needs to meet the 
following conditions. The person needs to be at least 21 years–old. S/he needs to have a 
driving licence (from the UK or a European Economic Area country). S/he needs to have the 
right to work in the UK. S/he needs to be a person of good character, which is assessed in 
physical and mental terms (see below section 2.2.). S/he needs to succeed in the Knowledge 
test. This test is famous for its toughness: it requires the driver to be able to name all the 
streets along 320 different routes in London and the main features within a quarter of miles of 
the drop points on these different routes. Usually a candidate spends three to four years 
scouring London streets to be able to succeed in this feat.27 This test is a way to hold low the 
number of taxi licences28 and to make access to the license time-consuming or at least not 
straightforward. It however features a range of other aspects, such as ensuring that taxi 
drivers are making the city more personalized, with a good knowledge of loopholes, dead-
ends and other complicated small streets and back street systems that makes accessibility of 
places remain impenetrable to GPS systems.29  
 
Barriers to entry in the trade are not quantitative but qualitative (by the imposition of the 
Knowledge test especially). There is no capping in the number of taxi licences available at 
any point in time. Any person who meets these conditions is licensed by TfL upon following 
the licensing procedure. The taxi driver licence is valid for three years.30 In 2017, the fees for 
a taxi licence amount to a little less than £1,000 plus the fee for the medical test (GP visit).31 
As such, the license has no monetary value.32 It can only be transferred in very specific cases, 
when the license holder passes away.33  
 
Vehicles licence. Vehicles need to meet the following conditions. First, by 1st January 2018, 
the vehicle needs to be « zero emissions capable » (prior to that a lower standard was set). 
This aligns with TfL’s general plan to introduce a « ultra low emission zone » by April 2019. 
From there on, most vehicles in London will need to either meet exhaust emission standards 
or pay a daily charge when travelling in central London.34 Secondly, the vehicle needs to 
have design features that make it fit to be a taxi (including wheelchair accessibility, 
                                               
25 S 4. 
26 Law Commission, Taxi and private hire services (Law Com n° 347), Cm 8864, 2014, p. 24. 
27 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/licensing/learn-the-knowledge-of-london .  
28 Niemietz and Zuluaga, above (6) p. 8. 
29 TfL, The Knowledge of London Examination System, April 2017. 
30 Greater London Authority Act 1999 Sch 20 s 5. 
31 Initial application: £120; DBS paper application: £58.85 or DBS online application: £56.85; Post office check 
and send: £7.15; Knowledge of London written examination (All London only) £200; Knowledge of London 
appearance (One off payment): £400; Issue of licence fee: £180. 
https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/licensing/apply-for-a-taxi-driver-licence#on-this-page-3  
32 See for a taxi driver license outside London: Cherwell and Anwar [2011] EWHC 2943 (Admin) at [15]. 
33 Greater London Authority Act 1999 Sch 20 s 5. 
34 Butcher, above (2) p. 14. 
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ventilation, taxi signs etc.).35 Thirdly, taxis must be fitted with a taximeter. Fourthly, they 
need to have a facility to accept card and contactless payment (with the ability to produce a 
printed receipt). Finally, taxis need to be presented to inspection (cost: £110). A taxi vehicle 
license is valid for one year.36  
 
The purchase of a suitable vehicle, meeting all these technical conditions, represents a 
significant investment. A London Taxi International TX4 (the current London taxi) is 
advertised new at a price between £62,400 and £64,800 depending on the model.37 In view of 
the stricter emission standards set for taxis from January 2018, a taxi de-licensing scheme has 
been set up for diesel taxis aged between 10 and 15 years: the taxi vehicle license and plate 
can be surrendered to TfL which pays the taxi owner a small amount in return.38 
Legal consequences. Once these licensing conditions are met, legal consequences 
intertwining closely obligations, rights and “fair privileges”39 follow for taxi drivers. Firstly, 
only licensed taxi drivers can ply for hire. Plying for hire without a licence is an offense.40 
Secondly, a taxi standing at a rank or stationary in a public place, and which is not already 
hired, is under an obligation to accept a trip (within 12 miles radius of the location (20 from 
Heathrow) or 1 hour duration) unless it has a reasonable excuse. Thirdly, only taxis are 
allowed to use taxi ranks and priority bus lanes. Finally, taxis fares are regulated:41 they are 
calculated automatically and made visible to the passenger as the journey progresses, through 
taximeters approved by TfL as complying with strict regulations42 in accordance with the EU 
directive on measuring instruments.43 For instance, taximeters can only be fitted by approved 
installers.44 This obligation is connected to the regulation of route fares. Journeys are 
calculated in time (minutes) when the taxi is idling (because stuck in traffic jam for instance) 
and in distance (miles) when the taxi is moving. Taxi users are free to challenge the fare at 
the end of the journey if they disagree with the fare and so to refuse to pay. It also means that 
only taxi drivers can use taximeters to vouch for their compliance with the fare regulations. 
2.1.3 PH (also known as “minicabs”) - System. Three licences need to be distinguished: a 
licence for the PH operator; a licence for the PH driver; and a licence for the PH vehicle.45 
This system has been progressively introduced between 2001 and 2004,46 with the aim to 
                                               
35 TfL, Construction and licensing of motor taxis for use in London – Condition of fitness, January 2007 
(updated version 9). 
36 Greater London Authority Act Sch 20 s 5. 
37 http://www.levc.com/technology/tx-price-specification/ (before taking into account options and accessories). 
38 Depending on the age of the vehicle, payment will be between £1,200 and £5,000. 
39 Mayor of London and TfL, Taxi and private hire action plan, 2016, p. 4. 
40 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 45. The penalty is a penalty not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale (i.e. 
£1,000). (Greater London Authority Act 1999 schedule 20 section 5).  
41 See below under section 2.3. 
42 Transport for London v Uber London Ltd [2015] EWHC 2918 at [28]; TfL, Taximeter specification - 
Specification for a taximeter to be approved for the use in a London taxi, 2017. 
43 Directive 2014/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of measuring 
instruments (recast), Annex IX.  
44 The full list can be found at http://content.tfl.gov.uk/taximeter-installation-service-centres.pdf . 
45 The vehicle is defined as “vehicle constructed or adapted to seat fewer than nine passengers which is made 
available with a driver for hire for the purpose of carrying passengers, other than a licensed taxi or a public 
service vehicle” (PHV Act 1998 section 1 (a)). We leave out the conditions for the vehicle. However, we need to 
note that vehicle emission standards apply. (Private Hire Vehicles (London PHV Licenses) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2011). It is difficult to specify how much purchasing a suitable vehicle would cost as different 
models and brands are available. The costs are however lower than for the purchase of a taxi vehicle. 
46 Butcher, above (2) p. 13. 
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ensure security for the PH users and the quality of service.47 Amendments to the system were 
brought in 2016, after public consultation, to take into account changes that Uber brought in 
the market.48 The main objectives of these changes were twofold: raising the standards in the 
industry and protecting consumers.49 
The PHV Act 1998 defines the PH operator as “a person who makes provision for the 
invitation or acceptance of, or who accepts, private hire bookings.”50 The key word here is 
“booking”: PH services require that a booking would be done through an operator. 
 
PH operators. To be licensed as a PH operator, applicants need to pass the fit and proper 
person test51 (see below section 2.2) This means that they need to comply with a range of 
technical conditions, such as record-keeping of bookings, record-keeping of drivers’ details, 
complaint-handling procedures or lost-and found property policy.52 Since 2016, PH operators 
have to notify TfL of any material changes that “may affect their compliance with the 
statutory and regulatory framework for operators or any conditions of their license.”53 This 
allows TfL to check whether the operator remains compliant with the “fit and proper person” 
criterion. This change was introduced after public consultation, when 96% of respondents 
agree with this proposed change.54 
 
The PH operator licence is valid for a period of five years. The costs for the licence depends 
on the number of vehicles operated. From 2013 to 2017, the structure distinguished only 
between a small operator (one or two vehicles), who paid a fee of £1,488, and a standard 
operator (more than 2 vehicles), who paid £2,826. However, this structure fee did not 
correspond to the market operators in 2017.55 A consultation was thus organised in early 
2017 to seek views of the market operators about possible adaptation of the fee structure.56 
There were around 2,400 PH operators in London, nearly 50% of them operate 10 or fewer 
vehicles, and only 5% in charge of fleets of more than 100 vehicles. At the time of the 
consultation, early 2017, only two operators operated a fleet of over 1,000 vehicles (Uber and 
Addison Lee) and only one operated a fleet of over 10,000 vehicles (Uber). The fee structure 
was thus re-organised around six categories: the minimum, a licence for 1 to 10 vehicles, 
costs £ 2,000 and the maximum, a licence for a fleet of more than 10,000 vehicles, costs £ 
2,900,000 (payable over the five years of the license).57 This effectively means that the larger 
operator pays 1,000 more in 2017 than previously. These new fees are meant to finance TfL’s 
needs to develop more resources to appropriately enforce regulations.58  
 
                                               
47 Mayor of London and TfL, Taxi and private hire action plan, 2016, pp. 4-5 and esp. pp. 8-9 (on public 
safety). 
48 The legal challenges brought by Uber are discussed below in sections 3.1.1 (hotline); 3.2.4 (English language 
test) and 3.2.5 (Insurance).  
49 TfL, Press release, TfL Board approves new plan to modernise London’s private hire industry, 18 March 
2016. 
50 S 1 (1) (b). 
51 S 3 (3). 
52 TfL, A guide for applicants who are applying for a London private hire operator’s licence, sd. The guide is 
frequently updated and advice applicants to “frequently visit www.tfl.gov.uk/tph for regular updates.” (see p. 4).  
53 The Private Hire Vehicles (London) (Operators’ Licences) (Amendment) (n°2) Regulation 2016.  
54 Mayor of London, Private hire regulations review - Consultation report, September 2015, p. 9. 
55 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/media/press-releases/2017/september/tfl-confirms-changes-to-private-hire-operator-
licence-fe . 
56 https://consultations.tfl.gov.uk/tph/private-hire-proposals/ . 
57 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/licensing/private-hire-operator-licence.  
58 See below under section 2.4. 
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PH drivers. To be licensed as a PH driver, the following conditions apply. The person needs 
to be at least 21 years–old. S/he needs to have a driving license (from the UK or an European 
Economic Area country). S/he needs to have the right to work in the UK. S/he needs to be a 
“fit and proper person”, (see below section 2.2). S/he needs to succeed in a test on 
topographical skills. A PH driver license is valid for three years. The fees for a PH driver 
licence amount to ca. £400 plus the fee for the medical test (GP visit).59 The main difference 
with the fees for taxi licences comes from the fee related to the Knowledge test.  
 
Changes. Two recent changes need to be mentioned here in connection with the increasing 
numbers of the PH driver licences in London. The first change relates to the reform of the test 
on topographical skills in 2016. Since then, only assessment centres that are recognised by 
TfL can organize the assessment and a TfL’s assessor is required to be present in the premise 
of the assessment centre.60 This proof of topical skills is not as demanding as the Knowledge 
test. It aims to test “the [driver’s] ability to use maps of different scales”, so that the driver 
has to demonstrate her/his ability to read and use maps, select routes in a local area, within 
London and outside London as well as a general geography of London and its major roads.61 
The second change, introduced also in 2016, relates to the introduction of an English test that 
aims to demonstrate that the driver has a B2 level in English (European Common Frame of 
Reference for Languages).62 The changes were introduced after public consultation. 99% of 
the respondents agreed on the need to introduce an English test.63 
Exemptions. Taxi drivers are exempted from licensing as a PH driver.64 In London, there is 
no dual licence: taxi drivers can work as PH driver without the need of any further license.  
Consequences. Once licensed, PH drivers need to be pre-booked through a PH operator. 
They cannot ply for hire, use taxi ranks or bus lanes. They cannot use taximeters. Since 2016, 
PH operators have to provide an estimated fare prior to the commencement of the journey.65 
1.2. Licensing: discretion to assess the fitness test 
General. Licensing authorities have the duty to assess if the applicant is a “fit and proper 
person”. This test is commonly found in a range of licencing matters in England. Examples 
are found in the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which requires the justice and sheriff to consider 
whether the owner is a person fit and proper to be in charge of the dog “when deciding 
                                               
59 Application fee: £124; Grant of license fee: £186; DBS online application £56.85 or DBS paper application: 
£58.85; Post office check and send: £7.15 (https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/licensing/private-
hire-driver-licence#on-this-page-3 ). 
60 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/licensing/topographical-assessment?intcmp=356  
61 TfL, London private hire driver licensing - A reference guide to becoming a private hire driver, PHV/201, p. 
4. 
62 The Private Hire Vehicles (London PHV Driver’s Licenses) (Amendments) (n°2) Regulation 2017 and The 
Private Hire Vehicles (London PHV Driver’s Licences) (Amendments) (n°2) Regulation 2016. On the link with 
Uber and the debates about this requirement, see below section 3.1.3. 
63 Mayor of London, Private hire regulations review - Consultation report, September 2015, p. 9. 
64 TfL, London private hire driver licensing - A reference guide to becoming a private hire driver, PHV/201, p. 
1.  
65 TfL, Press release, TfL Board approves new plan to modernise London’s private hire industry, 18 March 
2016. 
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whether the dog constitutes a danger for public safety”66 and in the financial services where 
regulated persons also need to pass the fit and proper test.67  
 
Applications on taxi and PH. In relation to taxi drivers, PH operators and PH drivers, this 
test is also required in more or less similar words: either directly a “fit and proper person”68 
or a similar expression (such as to be of “good character and fit to act as a cab-driver” for 
London taxi drivers69). Licensing authorities have a broad discretion in setting the exact 
standards and applying the “fit and proper person” test to the local conditions.70 However, 
case law requires that the licensing authority gives careful considerations to the elements (e.g. 
criminal convictions) that are relevant to the licensing matter,71 i.e. the safety of the public.  
This means that a DBS (Disclosure & Barring Service) check needs to be undertaken, which 
will return any criminal convictions that the applicant may have. Normally, DBS checks are 
carried out by the employer who needs to ask recognised bodies to formally check criminal 
bodies. A list of recognised bodies is maintained by the DBS at the Home Office.72 Criminal 
conviction will not automatically exclude the applicant from being licensed. Licensing 
authorities have to assess whether these criminal convictions make the applicant unfit and 
proper to be licensed as a taxi driver, PH operator or PH driver. Often, they will have 
guidelines on this matter. 
 
Licensing authorities can only take into account relevant elements when deciding on granting 
the licence. This means that personal circumstances, such as the need to provide for one’s 
family, are excluded of the considerations to be taken into account and should not prevail 
over the safety of the public that the licensing authority has the duty to protect.73 The same 
reasoning applies when a licensing authority suspends a licence74 or when it renews it.75 
Throughout the case law, this overarching purpose of protecting the public in general and the 
users of licensed vehicles in particular is prominent:76  
                                               
66 S 4B 2A. For case law, see e.g. Webb v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset [2017] EWHC 3311 (Admin). 
67 E.g. S 5 Sch 6 Threshold Conditions – Financial Services and Markets Act 2000; s 2E Markets Act 2000 
(Threshold Conditions) Order 2013/555 (which lists how “fit and proper” should be assessed in this specific 
context); for an example, see e.g. Larksway Investments Limited v The Financial Conduct Authority [2017] 
UKUT 422 (TCC). 
68 As provided in primary legislation: PHV Act 1998, s 13(2) (“The licensing authority shall grant a London 
PHV driver’s licence to an applicant if the authority is satisfied that […] the applicant […]is a fit and proper 
person to hold a London PHV driver’s licence […]”) and PHV Act 1998 s 3 (“The licensing authority shall 
grant a London PHV operator’s licence to the applicant if the authority is satisfied that (a) the applicant is a fit 
and proper person to hold a London PHV operator’s licence […]”).  
69 As provided in secondary legislation: London Cab Order 1934, para 25 (“[TfL] may in [its] discretion refuse 
to grant a cab-driver's licence (a) if the applicant fails to satisfy him that he is of good character and fit to act 
as a cab-driver, […]”). 
70 Law Commission, above (26), para 5.25. 
71 Adamson v. Waveney District Council [1997] 2 All E.R. 898 (QBD). 
72 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/responsible-organisations . 
73 Cherwell and Anwar [2011] EWHC 2943 (Admin); Leeds City Council v Hussain [2002] EWHC 1145 
(Admin); [2003] R.T.R. 13 (QBD (Admin)). 
74 Leeds City Council v Hussain [2002] EWHC 1145 (Admin); [2003] R.T.R. 13 (QBD (Admin)). 
75 Cherwell and Anwar [2011] EWHC 2943 (Admin). 
76 McCool v Rushcliffe BC [1998] 3 All E.R. 889 (QBD) per L. Bingham at [23]: “But the local authority […], 
are not permitted to grant the licence unless they are satisfied that the applicant is fit and proper. They may fail 
to be satisfied because adequate information of character and record is not forthcoming, […]; or they might fail 
to be satisfied for any other good reason. It is in my view impossible to be prescriptive as to what might amount 
to a good reason. What will be (or may be) a good reason will vary from case to case and vary according to the 
context in which those words appear. […] it is appropriate for the local authority or justices to regard as a 
good reason anything which a reasonable and fair-minded decision maker, acting in good faith and with proper 
regard to the interests both of the public and the applicant, could properly think it right to rely on.” 
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“the objectives of this licensing regime which is plainly intended, among other things, to 
ensure so far as possible that those licensed to drive private hire vehicles are suitable persons 
to do so, namely that they are safe drivers with good driving records and adequate 
experience, sober, mentally and physically fit, honest, and not persons who would take 
advantage of their employment to abuse or assault passengers.”77  
 
From the Law Commission’s consultation on taxis and PH, it appeared that flexibility in 
adapting the test over time to local circumstances was also of importance.78 Recent scandals 
involving taxi drivers have highlighted the importance for licensing authorities to pay special 
attention to the risks that drivers may represent for customers.79 
 
In London, the “fit and proper person” test has been spelled out in various guidance over time 
for taxi drivers, PH operators and PH drivers. In relation to taxi drivers, the “fit and proper 
person” test is expressed as a person being of “good character”. It is accepted that TfL is 
responsible for ensuring that the person is indeed well a fit and proper person.80 Regarding 
PH drivers, the guidance mentions mental and physical fitness and the “fit and proper test” 
that is interpreted as being of “good character”.81 Regarding PH operators, the criteria to be 
considered as a “fit and proper person” are divided into two categories: administrative rules 
and operating centre inspection. Under the administrative rules aspect, the applicant needs to 
demonstrate that it complies with “legal requirements connected with running a business” 
(including bankruptcy, company directorship, health and safety, accounts, planning 
permissions etc.).82 Under the operating centre inspection aspects, the applicant needs to 
“required to demonstrate that [s/he is] aware of the responsibilities of a licensed operator by 
showing” that a range of record-keeping processes and similar procedures are in place.83 For 
PH operators, TfL now considers that the operator is the person who is responsible to ensure 
that the drivers are “fit and proper”.84 On its website, TfL explains that the failure to do so, 
“may raise questions about an operator's fitness to hold a license”.85 
1.3. Regulatory powers 
Next to its licensing powers, TfL exercises regulatory powers on the taxis and PH industry in 
London, especially the setting and reviewing of taxi fares and tariffs and the regulation of 
taxi ranks. The overall objectives of these regulatory powers are public safety, fair 
competition and green mobility.86   
 
Taxis fares and tariffs. TfL is responsible for setting and reviewing taxi fares and tariffs. 
Fares are regulated by duration of the journey, distance and broken down in three tariffs 
                                               
77 McCool v Rushcliffe BC [1998] 3 All E.R. 889 (QBD) per L. Bingham at [7]. 
78 Law Commission, above (26), para 5.33. 
79 L. Casey, Report of inspection of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council (2015 HC 1050). 
80 Butcher, above (2) p. 12 (based on article 25 London Cab Order 1934). 
81 “TfL will only approve applications under this criterion if they are satisfied that the applicant is of good 
character”. To determine "good character" each applicant will be expected to: - provide evidence of their 
driving history (i.e. a copy of their current driving licence) - declare any Mental Health/Sexual Offence Orders - 
request an enhanced Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) disclosure […]” (TFL, London private hire driver 
licensing - A reference guide to becoming a private hire driver, PHV/201, p. 2). 
82 TfL, Aguide for applicants who are applying for a London private hire operator’s licence, pp. 8-10. 
83 Ibid. pp.10-11. 
84 See the relationship with Uber, section 3.1.3. 
85 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/new-private-hire-regulations. TFL, London private hire driver 
licensing - A reference guide to becoming a private hire driver, PHV/201, did not contain this explication. 
86 Mayor of London and TfL, Taxi and private hire action plan, 2016, passim. 
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depending on the time of the day (tariff 1: Monday to Friday 05:00-20:00; tariff 2: Monday to 
Friday: 20:00-22:00 and Saturday and Sunday 05:00-22:00; tariff 3: every night 22:00-05:00 
and public holidays). Extra charges are also regulated (e.g. booking by phone or online, 
Christmas surcharge and Heathrow transfer flat fee). These fares are negotiated with the taxi 
industry and TravelWatch/London, a statutory watchdog representing users’ interests.87 
 
Taxis ranks. TfL regulates taxi ranks: taxi ranks help ensure that taxi services can meet 
passenger demands.88 Specific regulations are made to identify where ranks can be held 
without disturbing traffic and neighbourhood. Over ranking can be problematic for local 
business and residents and can lead to traffic congestions or delay buses. For these reasons, 
only taxis can use taxis ranks: PH vehicles cannot do so as they would prevent taxis from 
using the ranks.  
Waiting time? TfL also sought to regulate the waiting time that PH vehicles had to wait 
between the pre-booking and the start of a trip: in 2015, it sought to impose a five-minute 
wait, on the ground that this amounted to an electronic form of hailing. The idea was to 
maintain the distinction between taxis (that can be hailed from the street and start the journey 
on the spot) and PH vehicles (that need to be pre-booked and cannot wait in a public space 
waiting to be approached). According to TfL, the use of digital platforms such as Uber made 
this distinction blurred and booking an Uber driver through the app and take the trip right 
away was an electronic form of hailing. However, this suggestion triggered a backlash as a 
petition in support of Uber received a wide public backing.89 The idea was not pursued.90 
1.4. Enforcement  
General. The approach to enforcement taken by different licensing authorities varies 
considerably as it is for each authority to determine how its enforcement policy is to be 
applied. One key element is however that licensing and its enforcement need to protect the 
public and its security. In case users experience problems with taxis or private hire drivers, 
they can turn to TfL to complain. This matter is heavily influenced by scandals that have 
surfaced in the taxi and PH industry in England. For instance, in the early 1990’s, gangs of 
PH in Birmingham had been found to participate in child abuses, which caused a massive 
uproar especially when it was finally unveiled more than 20 years later.91 Another scandal 
involving sexual harassment by a taxi driver in London had also made TfL extremely 
sensitive to this problem.92  
Enforcement powers. The legislation grants powers for licensing authorities, such as power 
of inspection to identify potential breaches of the law and enable targeted action to be taken; 
power to inspect vehicles;93 power to suspend or revoke licences;94 or power to refuse to 
renew them. Licensing authorities can bring criminal charges against a suspected offender.  
                                               
87 Butcher, above (2) p. 12.  
88 TfL, London taxi ranks, 2016, 52 p. 
89 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11900871/Thousands-sign-Uber-petition-against-London-plans-
to-ban-key-features.html . 
90 Mayor of London, Private hire regulations review – Consultation report, September 2015, p. 6. 
91 http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/birmingham-city-council-hid-links-8131813 
92 The matter has been reopened with the recent parole board’s decision to release the person. See: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-42789810. 
93  E.g. Greater London Authority Act 1999, Sch 20 s 3; PHV Act 1998 s 8 and 9. 
94 Greater London Authority Act 1999, Sch 20 s 5; PHV Act 1998 s 16. 
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Practical aspects. The overall cost of enforcing taxis and PH regulation between 2017 and 
2022 has been estimated to £30 million, up from a previous estimate of £4m.95 TfL directly 
funds 68 dedicated police cab enforcement officers, and has 250 additional staff hired in 
September 2017,96 following the 2016 Taxi and private hire action plan.97 To give an idea of 
the work involved, enforcement staff has made 171 arrests between April 2016 and February 
2017, of which 58 were for touting offences, and 28 for plying for hire offences.98 Statistics 
also reveal that criminal charges were brought against 25 drivers (13 Uber drivers, 12 non-
Uber PH drivers): 12 (5 Uber drivers) were convicted, 8 (5 Uber drivers) not convicted, 5 (3 
Uber drivers) await outcome.99 Quarterly meetings are held with taxis100 representatives and 
PH101 representatives to inform them of the enforcement actions taken and discuss pending 
issues of enforcement. Detailed statistics of the compliance among the industry are made 
available during these engagement exercises.102  
1.5. Taxis and PH: two different worlds?  
Overall there are three main differences between taxis and PH in London: regarding licensing 
conditions, legal consequences and overall regulation.  
Licensing conditions. The licensing conditions, and thus the “barrier to entry” in the trade 
are different, with the Knowledge test representing a more demanding exercise to entry in the 
taxi trade than the topographical test and the English test being only imposed to be licensed 
as PH drivers. The assessment of the “barrier to entry” is also different as the entity assessing 
the “fit and proper person” test also tends to differ. TfL is responsible for this assessment 
when it comes to taxi drivers. However, TfL seeks to displace this responsibility onto PH 
operators when it comes to assessing the “fit and proper person” test for PH drivers. In turn, 
if the PH operators were not carrying this assessment rigorously, they could be deemed as not 
being a “fit and proper person” to hold a PH operator license. This kind of displacement of 
responsibility may make sense in view of the practical enforcement on the ground: could TfL 
be expected to carry out the test for all the new applications to PH driver licenses 
(approximatively 300 a week)? However, this displacement may result in unintended 
consequences. For instance, it is unclear how PH operators carry out this test in practice, 
which can request them to screen more closely their drivers. Would it also be possible that 
PH operators use this test to pressurise drivers who would be willing to join unions? How 
could PH (candidate) drivers challenge this operator’s decision? Could we see here a form of 
substitution of public regulation and oversight by one of a private nature?   
 
                                               
95 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/media/press-releases/2017/september/tfl-confirms-changes-to-private-hire-operator-
licence-fe . 
96 https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/safety-and-security/security-on-the-network/cab-enforcement . 
97 Mayor of London and TfL, Taxi and private hire action plan, 2016, p. 8. 
98 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/compliance-and-enforcement?intcmp=30451#on-this-page-3. 
An engagement policy (April 2017) has been issued with the stated aims of “Identifying and addressing issues 
of concerns affecting drivers; Devising and implementing taxi policy and changes to fares; Working in 
partnership to maintain and further enhance the world renowned status of London’s iconic taxi service.” 
(available: http://content.tfl.gov.uk/taxi-engagement-policy-april-2017.pdf). 
99 https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/safety-and-security/security-on-the-network/tph-related-sexual-offences.  
100 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/taxi-meetings?intcmp=48644 (no engagement policy is 
available on-line). 
101 https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/private-hire-meetings?intcmp=48647 . 
102 E.g.: http://content.tfl.gov.uk/taxi-operational-performance-meeting-october-2017-slides.pdf and 
http://content.tfl.gov.uk/phv-licensing-compliance-and-enforcement-october-2017.pdf.  
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Consequences. Only taxis can ply for hire and have some privileges regarding road usage 
(taxi ranks, priority lanes), while PH drivers need to be pre-booked. Taxis however cannot 
refuse to take a ride unless they have reasonable grounds to do so.  
 
Fares. Fares are differently structured in the taxi and the PH industry. On the one hand, taxi 
fares are regulated and only London taxis must be fitted with taximeters. Taximeters operate 
an impartial and objective fare determination. Customers can challenge the taxi fare at the 
end of the journey if they disagree. On the other hand, the user is required to receive an 
estimate of the journey costs when s/he does the PH booking. S/he can then negotiate the 
price if they so wish.  
 
Overall. For the CJEU, some of these differences (including the obligation to take a 
customer, the Knowledge test, wheelchair accessibility, and taximeters) justify that the taxi 
industry and the PH industry are two different industries, so that advantages granted to the 
ones do not constitute a selective advantage and thus an illegal state aid.103 This means that  
taxi and PH are not in comparable situations, despite performing similar functions (i.e. 
transporting somebody from one place to another against a fee). The following section details 
how the distinction and boundaries between taxi and PH industry have been tested when 
Uber arrived in London. 
 
III. Uber104 and its legal challenges  
 
Uber first arrived in London in 2012, just on time for the Olympics.105 When Uber launched 
in the British capital, it was expanding globally at a fast pace, but its technology was not a 
major disruptor in London. This is witnessed, e.g., by the fact that Uber did not attract the 
younger drivers, as Uber demographics show that drivers are older than other providers of the 
gig-economy.106 In addition, the ride-hailing platform Hailo had already capitalized on a 
network of nearly 10,000 taxis.107 Despite a fierce competition with ride hailing platforms 
Hailo and Addison Lee, Uber has overall been able to develop its activities legally.108 Soon, 
Lyft will also enter the PH market,109 which might overhaul the sector once again.  
 
Although Uber did not bring per se technological innovation in London, it largely contributed 
to expand the PH digital platforms there and competed on the existing market by driving its 
pricing down. For instance, Uber developed a specific algorithm for the pooling of journeys 
to decrease the cost for users. Uber did not only constitute a bargain for PH userss, but it was 
perceived as a threat for taxi drivers. Indeed, as witnessed by bankruptcy cases, the taxi 
sector suffered110 and the risk for abuse of Uber’s dominant position was also felt by the 
                                               
103 CJEU, Eventech v. The parking adjudicator, [2015] 14 January 2015 C-518/13, at §61. 
104 Unless otherwise stated, when referring to “Uber” here, we mean UberX/Uber Black, not other services 
provided by Uber such as UberEats or UberPop. Indeed, UberPop was not offered in London, while UberEats is 
not a service to transport people but a food delivery service, falling outside the scope of this report.  
105 The initial license was granted on May 31st, 2012. (TfL, FOI-1669-1718, especially file called “docs 
2218_s40(2)”). 
106 House of Lords, Gig Economy, Library briefing, 21st November 2017. 
107 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/27/how-uber-conquered-london  
108 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/11822711/Since-Uber-launched-there-are-26pc-
more-cabs-in-London.html  
109 See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/09/23/uber-arch-rival-lyft-holds-talks-transport-london-
plots-global/ 
110 Stephen Paul Grand, Anthony Malcolm Cork v. Ronald Charles Henry Baker [2016] EWHC 1782 (Ch), 18 
July 2016. 
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Competition and Market Authority, which took measures to ensure that drivers could enrol 
on several ride-hailing platforms at the same time (i.e. “multihoming”).111  
 
When entering the London market in 2012, Uber attempted to mitigate any legal risks: it did 
not start its popular UberPop practice but only its licensed drivers’ services. In 2015, Uber 
launched its service UberPool after long discussions with TfL: it was indeed willing to abide 
by the rules.112 
 
Although Uber sought to abide by the rules, its development led to disapproval in many 
respects. Although Uber was initially licensed in London, recent debates led to criticisms and 
judicial challenges regarding the licensing system in London113 (3.1). Furthermore, drivers 
face an increasing number of conditions to meet to carry out their activity (3.2). Last but not 
least, Uber relationship with its own drivers has come under fire (3.3). 
1.6. The regulatory status of Uber in London 
As already explained above, London’s stance on mobility and especially non-public means of 
transportation favoured the early development of PH operators. Uber initially sought to 
comply with the local regulations. It did not try to avoid being considered as a taxi company 
but rather chose to apply to TfL for a PH operator license.114 It was at first licensed as a PH 
operator on 31st May 2012. Its relationship with TfL became more contentious in the course 
of this licence on the following four accounts: first, Uber challenged a new requirement 
introduced by TfL in the licensing system, namely hotlines (3.1.1); secondly, Uber faced 
compliance issues (3.1.2); thirdly, TfL refused to renew Uber’s licence (3.1.3); finally, 
special attention needs to be given to Uber’s deceptive data collection, a specific ground 
levelled by TfL to refuse renewing Uber’ licence (3.1.4). 
3.1.1 Licensing process: hotline. As discussed above (section 2.1.3), TfL sought to adapt the 
licensing system to the new market situation in 2016. It added new requirements for licensing 
operators following extended consultation with stakeholders. Some of these requirements115 
were challenged by Uber, including the licensing condition relating to the operation of a 
“hotline” (sensu lato), namely that “[a]t all times during the operator's hours of business and 
at all times during the journey, the operator shall ensure that the passenger for whom the 
booking was made is able to speak to someone at the operating centre if they want to make 
any complaint or discuss any other matter either carrying out of the booking”.116 Uber 
judicially challenged this telephone availability requirement.117 The requirement was 
amended in 2017 (before the judgement on the judicial review was delivered) as to allow call 
centres outside the business premises to receive complaints from users. 
                                               
111 CMA Chairman, David Currie, at the Concurrences Innovation Economics Conference, King’s 
College London, 3 February 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-currie-on-the-role-of-
competition-in-stimulating-innovation  
112 Information Commissioner Office, FOI decision notice nr FS50641222, 4 January 2017.  
113 All appeals against taxi and private hire licensing authorities go before a magistrate’s court, except the 
refusal of a new hackney carriage proprietor license and the refusal of license renewal, which go to a Crown 
Court, See R (on the application of Shanks) v Northumberland County Council [2012] EWHC 1539 (Admin).  
114 See TfL, FOI-1669-1718, especially file called “docs 2218_s40(2)”. 
115 The other changes challenged were the English test and the insurance requirement (see below sections 3.2.4 
and 3.2.5). 
116 The Private Hire Vehicles (London) (Operator’s Licence)(Amendment) Regulations 2016, s 4(1) amending 
the  Private Hire Vehicles (London) (Operator’s Licence) Regulations 2000, s 9(11). 
117 R. on the Application of Uber London Limited, Mr Sandor Balogh, Mr Nikolay Dimitrov, Mr Imran Khan v 
Transport for London, CO/4130/2016, 3 March 2017, 2017 EWHC 435 (Admin) by Mitting J. 
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The requirement, as challenged by Uber, is not limited to emergencies (what would be called 
a ‘hotline’ sensu stricto), but needs to answer to any kind of complaints, even not urgent. 
This requirement implies enormous costs: it is estimated that it might be just under the 
threshold of £ 1 million if done from an India-based call-centre, significantly more if done 
from Europe. According to Uber, its algorithmic treatment of complaints helped identify 
urgent matters, which were responded to immediately. Furthermore, it argued that it 
suspended drivers involved in critical incidents for the time of the investigation.118 Although 
Mitting J accepted TfL’s argument that having someone on the phone in case of emergency 
can be very reassuring, he quashed the regulation because of its too large scope and that other 
less costly means were available. In addition, users of an app-based transport facilitation 
service might also be expected to have a smaller need for phone contacts. Mitting J 
nevertheless kept the door open for a new regulation involving a “hotline” in case of 
emergencies.119  
3.1.2 Compliance. Between 2012 and 2017, TfL carried out ten routine inspections at Uber’s 
facilities.120 Two of the inspections concluded to non-compliance. In April 2015, Uber 
matched the majority of licensing requirements with a few minor discrepancies (category of 
outcome n°2). The non-compliance resulted from issues with drivers’ insurances. 
Consequently, TfL brought a case against Uber for despatching work to drivers without 
insurance.121 In August 2016, Uber did not meet the PH license requirements, without serious 
non-compliance issues (category of outcome n°6). The inspection had been triggered by 
drivers showing up on the app, while their license had been revoked by TfL. Thereafter, Uber 
took all the reasonable steps to mitigate this case of non-compliance and TfL did not take any 
further action.  
3.1.3 Licence renewal. In 2017, Uber’s five-year licence expired so that it had to apply for 
renewal. As part of this process, TfL had to consider whether Uber was a ‘fit and proper’ 
business to hold a PH operator licence. While TfL did not disclose the full decision,122 the 
press release reads as follows: 
“TfL considers that Uber's approach and conduct demonstrate a lack of corporate responsibility 
in relation to a number of issues which have potential public safety and security implications. 
These include: 
• Its approach to reporting serious criminal offences. 
• Its approach to how medical certificates are obtained. 
• Its approach to how Enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) checks are obtained. 
• Its approach to explaining the use of Greyball in London - software that could be used to 
block regulatory bodies from gaining full access to the app and prevent officials from 
undertaking regulatory or law enforcement duties.”123 
As a result, Uber’s licence was not renewed and Uber’s development is thus in jeopardy in 
London. However, Uber still works because it keeps the right to operate during the appeal 
process.124 The hearing is planned to take place in April 2018.125 Simultaneously, Uber 
                                               
118 2017 EWHC 435 (Admin), at [34]. 
119 2017 EWHC 435 (Admin), at [45]. 
120 TfL, FOI-2636-1617, 12 October 2017. 
121 See cases n°01140145717 & 011401736305, as referred to in the TfL, FOI-2190-1718, 11 December 2017.  
122 See, for instance, TfL, FOI-1589-1718, 17 November 2017.  
123 TfL, “Licensing decision on Uber London Limited”, 22 September 2017, Press Release, http://bit.do/TfL-
Uber-Ban.  
124 See Local Government Act 1976 s 77. 
125 http://bit.do/uber-appeal  
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committed to improve its internal governance and decided to negotiate specific conditions of 
exploitation with TfL. Citizens launched a petition supporting Uber, which gathered over 
500,000 signatures under a week after its announcement.126 
As far as criminal offences are reported, this licensing issue finds its origins in the need to 
verify the records of drivers to support their honesty as a ‘fit and proper person’. In early 
2017, a Metropolitan police inspector made public statements and wrote an open letter to 
TfL, arguing that Uber failed to report offences committed by its drivers in a timely manner. 
This behaviour led to reoffending which could have been avoided.127 As far as medical and 
DBS checks are concerned, Uber argued that the fault was on TfL, which had an exclusive 
agreement with a private firm for carrying out such research.128 Therefore, it blamed TfL’s 
choice of the DBS handler and considered that its role in the verification process is 
completely passive as it could not even choose the provider.  
3.1.4 Deceptive data collection. Uber’s practices with regards to data collection and use have 
raised concerns in London, as in England and at the global level. Firstly, Greyball’s use was 
first discovered in the United States but had in fact a worldwide scope.129 Its purpose was 
created to identify customers who had an illegitimate (in Uber’s eyes) use of the application, 
and to give them a truncated vision of the localization of drivers on the map, as to protect 
them.130 It was, admittedly, used to avoid law enforcement in cities where Uber was 
prohibited and therefore offered drivers a certain degree of confidence in the platform that 
they would not be prosecuted.131 As a consequence, this software was explicitly mentioned in 
the 2017 license renewal refusal, as it demonstrates a lack of corporate responsibility, which 
might be assumed to be required to constitute a ‘fit and proper’ business.   
 
Secondly, Uber covered up for a massive data breach which occurred in October 2016. It 
failed to report it in due time and by adequate means to the competent English authorities 
(Information Commissioner, the National Cyber Security Centre and the UK government). 
Hackers accessed the personal data of over 2,5 million people during this security breach in 
the United Kingdom alone.132 This supported an increase in the maximum amount of the 
fines for businesses failing to comply with data protection rules, which were already under 
review at the time.133 Labour MP Kevin Brennan also underlined the ambiguity of Uber 
during oral questions to Matt Hancock, Minister for Digital: Uber did not hesitated to call for 
signing the petition supporting the renewal of the licence, with a general email to its users, 
but refused to send out an email to all its (affected) English users apologizing and giving 
                                               
126 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/23/uber-petition-reverse-ban-london-hits-500000-signatures-
backlash/; the petition is accessible at https://www.change.org/p/save-your-uber-in-london-saveyouruber.  
127 The full letter written on 12 April 2017 by N. Billany (Met Police Inspector) and addressed to Helen 
Chapman (TfL) is accessible on http://bit.do/uber-crimes.  
128 See, e.g., http://bit.do/uber-dbs. 
129 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-authorities.html. See also  
http://bit.do/uber-greyball. 
130 Joe Sullivan, Chief Security Officer at Uber, "An update on "greyballing", 8 March 2017, 
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/an-update-on-greyballing/ 
131 Uber however contends that it never used Greyball to dodge the law in the United Kingdom. See 
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/local-news/cardiff-uber-licence-operate-london-13658730 . 
132 James Dipple-Johnstone (ICO Deputy Commissioner), ICO Statement on Uber Data breach, 29 November 
2017, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2017/11/latest-ico-statement-on-uber-
data-breach/.  
133 Data Protection Bill [HL] 2017-19. Uber’s data breach is part of most discussions after it was first revealed 
in November 2017. 
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them notice of the data breach!134 Such lack of responsiveness/promptness in reporting the 
data breach was not assessed in the September 2017 licence refusal by TfL (but could still be 
part of the negotiations going on with TfL). This argument was nevertheless used 
subsequently by other city councils in later applications to refuse to consider that Uber is a 
‘fit and proper’ business to operate in the PH sector (see below, section 4).  
1.7. The regulatory status of Uber drivers  
Once Uber obtained its initial PH operator license in 2012, most drivers started applying for 
PH vehicles licenses. In addition, Uber also offers booking and dispatching services to black 
cabs, which are already licensed as taxis. Four issues arose in respects to Uber PHV licensed 
drivers: Firstly, only taxi-licensed cars can be equipped with a taximeter (3.2.1). Secondly, 
only taxi-licensed cars can use priority lanes (3.2.2). Thirdly, the distinction between pre-
booking and instant hailing on the one hand and pick-up areas and taxi ranks on the other 
hand has been tested (3.2.3). Fourthly, Uber drivers need to show that they have a sufficient 
knowledge of English language (3.2.4). Fifthly, insurance matters have arisen (3.2.5).  
3.2.1 Prohibition of taximeters. Section 11 PHV Act prohibits private hire cars to be 
equipped with a taximeter. The ratio legis of this section is that taximeters in PHV could give 
the impression to customers that the fare is regulated. However, the License Taxi Drivers 
Association (LTDA) and Licensed Private Hire Car Association (LPHCA) privately 
prosecuted Uber on the claim that Uber app amounted to a taximeter. The case was 
adjourned. However, a civil test case involving TfL and Uber ensued (Transport for London 
v Uber London Ltd).135  
A distant server rather than the drivers’ smartphone carries out the fare calculation of the base 
and additional fares. The smartphone uses its enabled GPS and clock data to merely records 
basic features of the journey, such as time and location. The smartphone and the app do not 
perform any computation. Data for the base fare (e.g. the kind of vehicle used) and for the 
additional fare (e.g. time idling in traffic) are gathered by the smartphone, which sends them 
to an US based server. Taking into account information specific to journeys as well as 
general information about London (e.g. the London-fare algorithm (which is a trade secret), 
potential surge pricing), the server determines the final price of the ride (at [11]-[15]). At no 
point during the journey, neither the driver nor the customer have access to the amount to be 
paid. While an estimate fare is given at pick-up, the exact amount is only communicated at 
the end of the journey. Besides, the phones equip the driver rather than the mini-cab itself.  
LTDA and LPHCA claimed that the application generates the expectation of “objectivity in 
calculation, authority and reliability” (at [25]). Ouseley J found instead that no language 
preventing such mechanisms is to be found the legislation (at [26]). Disregarding the social 
and economic reality, Ouseley J considered that no confusion could happen between an Uber 
and an official black cab (at [29]). He therefore rejected the argument (at [26]). Ultimately, 
the Act does not regulate technologies and rather attempts to organize the business model of 
taxis and minicabs (at [28] and [34]). Indeed, smartphones do not work as taximeters as they 
do not compute themselves the fare, but merely record useful information. As the price to be 
paid is not shown ‘live’ to users, Ouseley J found that a smartphone does not function as a 
taximeter (at [49]). 
                                               
134 Hansard, Debates, HC, 23 November 2017, vol. 631, col 1179-1183.   
135 Transport for London v Uber London Ltd [2015] EWHC 2918 (Admin) (16 October 2015). 
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Noteworthy is that taxi-licensed drivers need to be equipped with a taximeter and have to use 
it even when working for Uber. Hence, they have to tap into the application the amount on 
the taximeter screen and this amount will be billed to the customer (at [13]). In this limited 
hypothesis, the fares are regulated just as for taxis, but in other circumstances where Uber 
calculates the fares through its server, the fare is left unregulated.  
3.2.2 Prohibition of priority lanes use. The issue of using priority lanes has raised concerns 
from a competition law perspective when Uber started in London. Indeed, Eventech, a 
subsidiary company of Addison Lee, renting cars to drivers of the latter, challenged before 
the Parking Adjudicator136 two penalty charge notices for two of their cars using priority bus 
lanes without being adequately licensed. The case was eventually referred to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling on the claim that the priority 
bus lane policy created a state aid in favour of taxis.  
On the one hand, Advocate General Wahl directly correlates this issue with the development 
of app-based PH companies. Smartphones based facilitation had indeed created fierce 
competition.137 Advocate General Wahl considered that the bus lane policy did not constitute 
a state aid on the grounds that there was no transfer of State resources, taxis and PH vehicles 
are not in legally and factually comparable situations, and it is not unreasonable to make such 
distinction in any case. On the other hand, the CJEU was not that settled and considered 
merely that such measure “does not appear” to constitute a selective State aid, although it is 
for the referring court to ultimately decide.138 The English courts had, by then, also 
considered that the priority lane policy did not constitute a State aid.139 
 
3.2.3 Pre-booking and taxi ranks. According to Arnold J, “the essential distinction between 
a London taxi and a PH vehicle is that a taxi may be hired from a rank or on the street, but a 
PH vehicle must be pre-booked. This distinction has been somewhat eroded, however, since 
the advent of apps like Hailo and GetTaxi (which are primarily for taxis) and Uber (which is 
primarily for PH vehicles)”.140 Equally, the CJEU accepts that the taxi industry and the PH 
industry are not comparable as it pointed out the counterpart of “instant booking” for taxi 
customers, namely that it implies for taxi drivers to accept rides to any destination, while this 
is not a case for black cabs.141 
TfL seeks to maintain a difference between taxis and PH. For instance, an issue related to the 
construction of pre-booking arose when the O2 Arena (which is part of the same group as 
AEG) put up signs reading “Uber pick-up area” on the parking of the Arena near the place 
where PH vehicles could pick-up and set down their customers after AEG and Uber entered 
into a partnership. This did not please TfL because it created an unfair competition between 
Uber drivers and other PH drivers. Firstly, the advertising deterred Uber’s competitors from 
                                               
136 S. 81 Traffic Management Act 2004 provides with a judicial office allowed to hear appeals for penalty charge 
notices issued by enforcement authorities for alleged contraventions to traffic regulations. 
137 AG Wahl, Opinion, Eventech Ltd contre Parking Adjudicator [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2239 (24 September 
2014) C-518/13, at §2. 
138 CJEU, Eventech v. The parking adjudicator [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:9 (14 January 2015), C-518/13, at §63. 
139 Eventech v. The parking adjudicator [2012] EWHC 1903. 
140 London Taxi Corp Ltd (t/a London Taxi Co) v Fraser-Nash Research Ltd, 20 January 2016, [2016] EWHC 
52 (Ch), [2016] E.T.M.R. 18 by Arnold J (at 72, p. 331-332). Arnold J implicitly refers to PHV Act 1998; the 
London Hackney Carriages Acts of 1831, 1843, 1850 and 1853; the London Cab Order 1934 (as amended, in 
particular by the Greater London Authority Act 1999); the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869; the London 
Cab and State Carriage Act 1907.  
141 ECJ, Eventech v. The Parking Adjudicator [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:9 (14 January 2015) C-518/13, at §7. 
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entering the zone, as it seemed to be reserved to Uber cars. Secondly, Uber cars started to 
wait for customers coming from the arena to be dispatched to them, which, in turned 
prevented other PHV companies to enter in the pick-up area despite having proper bookings. 
Uber recognized the lack of diplomacy of such ad, and had it finally removed.142 This 
illustrates how TfL construes the notion of ‘instant booking’ against ‘hailing’, despite the 
lack of an overarching conceptualization. It also shows how TfL seeks to maintain its own 
taxi rank policy (justified on the ground of public safety and mobility) and does not welcome 
attempts by Uber to develop strategies that lead to a form of taxi rank, all but in name and 
public endorsement. 
3.2.4 English language. In 2016, TfL adopted a new policy requiring PH operators to test 
the English proficiency skills of drivers. Indeed, three quarters of Uber’s drivers in London 
are coming from countries where English is not the native language.143 TfL introduced this 
test because it feared that PH drivers would not be able to understand queries by passengers, 
regulatory changes or even traffic tickets. As a result, PH drivers need to show a knowledge 
of English at B1 level according to the European Common Frame of Reference for Language 
tests. This language level, the third level on a scale of six, requires a person to understand 
complex situations in a familiar environment, such as one’s work. Among others, it includes 
an essay which is not so directly targeted for drivers, but courts have accepted it to be the less 
restrictive means to achieve an acceptable objective of public interest. Although the testing 
has been judicially challenged by foreign Uber drivers, courts have maintained it so far.144 
However, Uber has appealed this decision.145   
This test has raised concerns for several reasons. Firstly, it has widespread adverse effects of 
such policy on foreign drivers, which might be refrained from continuing their activity 
because they lack language skills and because Uber provide financially for many non-English 
speaking individuals.146 Secondly, it creates a barrier to entry on the market, as those English 
tests, as well as the optional but useful preparatory courses, are expensive.147 Thirdly, the 
London Assembly adopted in March 2017 a motion calling on the Mayor to limit the 
assessment to a speaking test, excluding therefore a written test.148  
3.2.5 Insurance. In 2016, TfL introduced a new paragraph 1 in schedule 11 and a condition 
14 in schedule 2 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London Private Hire Vehicles Licences), 
Regulation 2004 making it compulsory to have an insurance covering the use of the vehicle 
for hire or reward and to display the proof of such insurance in order to ensure a full coverage 
to the passengers, carried for reward or without intent of profit. However, Uber challenged 
this requirement as being unnecessary. Indeed, the case Bristol Alliance Limited Partnership 
v Williams149 decided in 2012 allows car victims to claim their damages whatever the scope 
of the insurance was. It is then for the insurer to prove that the driver was not using its 
vehicle under the conditions of coverage of the insurance policy. Therefore, the insurer 
                                               
142 TfL, FOI-1590-1718, 11 December 2017. 
143 House of Lords Briefing above (nr 99), p.11.  
144 R. on the Application of Uber London Limited, Mr Sandor Balogh, Mr Nikolay Dimitrov, Mr Imran Khan v 
Transport for London, CO/4130/2016, 3 March 2017, 2017 EWHC 435 (Admin) by Mitting J. 
145 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-40427983 . 
146 R. on the Application of Uber London Limited, Mr Sandor Balogh, Mr Nikolay Dimitrov, Mr Imran Khan v 
Transport for London, CO/4130/2016, 3 March 2017, 2017 EWHC 435 (Admin). 
147 An applicant would have to pay £300, www.capstar.co/training/; www.trinitycollege.com/site/?id=3640.  
148 https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/assembly/english-speaking-should-be-private-hire-test. Other 
licencing authorities have lower English language requirements: https://consultations.tfl.gov.uk/tph/private-hire-
regulations-review/supporting_documents/English%20language%20Reqts.pdf. 
149 [2012] EWCA Civ. 1267; [2013] QB 826. 
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(rather than the victim) has to recover the money from the driver. TfL became aware of this 
construction during the judicial challenge of the requirement (on its lawyers’ advice) and 
hence decided subsequently to waive it.150 
1.8. Contractual relationship between Uber and its drivers: contractor or worker?  
From a contractual perspective, the legal characterization of the relationship between Uber 
and its drivers has been a centre of attention throughout the world. In England, the landmark 
decision Uber v. Aslam from October 2016,151 characterized Uber drivers as “workers”. 
While Uber always considered its drivers to be independent contractors, Aslam and twenty 
other drivers claimed that they qualified at least as “workers”, an intermediary status between 
employee and independent contractor. They argue that they were instructed, managed and 
controlled by the platform. Therefore they invoked a right to minimal wage and paid leave 
against Uber.152 Conversely, Uber argued that it was merely preserving the integrity of the 
platform without directing the drivers themselves. The decision followed the claimants. 
The way had been paved to this solution by the UK Supreme Court which had already 
characterized sham ‘independent’ contracts of parking valets as labour agreements. Indeed, in 
Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher,153 Sedley LJ and Clark LJ preferred a purposive interpretation of the 
contract and considered that the practice of the parties rather than the language of contract 
solely had to be examined.154 Building on such methodology in Uber v. Aslam, Snelson J 
examined the factual relationship between Uber and its drivers. Indeed, the vocabulary used 
in the contracts show much twisted language in favour of the platform. Hence, it makes it 
difficult to really interpret the contract and there is a need to give more attention to the 
economic reality between the parties. Snelson J identified eleven elements (e.g.: impossibility 
to negotiate standard terms; Uber acts as a transport business rather than as an intermediary; 
impossibility for drivers to ”grow” their business, except by working more hours) 
contradicting the characterisation as “independent” and assimilating drivers to workers (at 
[87]-[102]).155 Uber appealed.  
On Appeal, Eady J developed more on this methodology. She found, for instance, that Uber 
emits an invoice on behalf of the drivers to customers at the end of the journey. However, in 
practice, the invoices consist rather in receipts for drivers than in a formal request to pay the 
fare to drivers, as these invoices are not even transferred to the users. Similarly, when Uber 
started operating in London, it guaranteed an income for new drivers to attract them. Despite 
this not being the case later on, this does not necessarily show a change in the relationship 
with drivers. Indeed, other elements still show that drivers are in a position similar to 
workers. For instance, Uber accepts the burden of the risks when the application is used 
fraudulently, leading to the cancellation of the credit card charge and does not pass this loss 
to drivers. In addition, the performance of the contract is not transferable. Furthermore, 
drivers accept to be subject to a penalty system when refusing to take trips three times in a 
row. Finally, drivers and passengers do not agree on the terms of the ride, but the platform 
                                               
150 R. on the Application of Uber London Limited, Mr Sandor Balogh, Mr Nikolay Dimitrov, Mr Imran Khan v. 
Transport for London, CO/4130/2016, 3 March 2017, [2017] EWHC 435 (Admin) by Mitting J at [44]. 
151 Aslam & Ors v Uber BV & Ors [2016] EW Misc B68 (ET) (28 October 2016). 
152 See Employment Rights Act 1996 s230(3)(b).  
153 [2011] UKSC 41. 
154 On using the ‘economic reality test’ and ‘control test’, see e.g. L. Ratti, “Online Platforms and Crowdwork in 
Europe: A Two-Step Approach to Expanding Agency Work Provisions”, (2017) 38 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 
477.  
155 Aslam & Ors v Uber BV & Ors [2016] EW Misc B68 (ET) (28 October 2016). 
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sets its own conditions. Therefore, Eady J found that Uber controls the drivers. She thus 
confirmed the Employment Tribunal decision.156 
In response to these decisions, Uber claimed that the flexibility enjoyed by drivers in its 
business model was at risk, while proponents of the decisions found that it only threatened 
Uber’s profits, rather than the freedom of the drivers.157 While Uber also asserted that the 
decision only concerned the two drivers having initiated the proceedings and not the overall 
float, legal scholars pointed out that such understanding would constitute a deep 
misconception of the common law principle of precedent.158  
This case was much expected.159 It led to much literature on labour relations in the gig 
economy, often in a prospective regulation manner.160 Following a strict interpretation of the 
case, drivers are to be classified as workers. Some authors argue however that Uber drivers 
could fall easily in the class of “employee” (rather than the intermediary class of “workers”) 
because all the required elements could be found in the judgment,161 notwithstanding the 
practical hurdles to apply such a broad protection in the digital world.162  
This decision impacts both individual163 and collective labour law.164 Some authors have 
examined specific work circumstances such as the possibility of working while being 
engaged in peripheral tasks (i.e. it includes waiting periods and not merely ‘core production’) 
as there is a need for a quick response from workers switching from a stand-by position to 
actually providing the service.165 Similarly, authors have noted large-scale outsourcing of a 
specific form of skilled labour to participate of a new definition of a labour relationship.166 In 
addition, this case has been used to contrast the prohibition to unionize for Deliveroo drivers 
(a food delivery service also belonging to the gig economy).167  
Moving forward, the legislator and scholarship need to take into account several hurdles 
showing the importance of the issues and the difficulty to tackle them.  
                                               
156 Uber BV v Aslam & Ors [2017] UKEAT (0056_17_1011) (10 November 2017), [2017] WLR(D) 809.  
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158 E. Rubin above n (157) at 169. See also E. McGaughey, “Uber Fraud, Mutuality and the Taylor Review”, 
Industrial Law Journal, forthcoming. Available at ssrn.com/abstract=3018516, at 3. 
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Firstly, the Uber case is not an isolated decision. For instance, in Lange & Others v. Addison 
Lee, drivers claimed minimum wage and paid leave. In September 2017, Pearl J held on 
grounds similar to the findings in Aslam v. Uber that the drivers were also ‘workers’ rather 
than self-employed and could therefore benefit from more social protection.168 Secondly, the 
Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev in a case referred to the CJEU for preliminary ruling 
by the British Employment Tribunal169 creates an argument suggesting that gig-workers who 
did not take their paid leave are still entitled to be paid for them because they thought they 
were independent, while normally the money is only paid upon their use.170 Thirdly, facing 
these regulatory issues of the employment relation in the gig-economy, the British 
government called a review on modern employment practices (‘The Taylor Review’). This 
review recommended to organise the work of ‘dependent contractors’, rather than employees 
or workers.171 However, the implementation of such proposal sounds rather uncertain because 
the Prime Minister did not want to commit to follow the recommendations.172 Fourthly, the 
House of Commons has also looked into the gig economy. Their report suggests adapting 
self-employed contributions to the social security system, to distinguish true flexibility from 
profit-making and establish a legal presumption that individual work in an employment 
relationship rather than as independent contractors.173  
An important insight for further policy is that Uber offers now a sickness and injury 
insurance for drivers having carried out more than 500 rides for £2 per week.174 This new 
development illustrates Uber’s willingness towards respecting minimal labour conditions in 
London. 
IV. Uber outside London  
 
Outside London, the England-wide legislation175 makes licensing primarily the responsibility 
of local authorities for both taxis and PH. It sets a general framework (e.g. the “fit and proper 
person” test to hold a license,176 see above section 2.2), within which local authorities have 
discretion to tailor their regulation to their preferences or specificities. For instance, councils 
can lay down licensing policies. They can also determine the application procedure and the 
circumstances in which a license may or may not be granted. Most of the times, they do not 
regulate taximeters outside London. This means that licensing authorities have the choice to 
let PH drivers use taximeters. The Department for Transport issues non-binding ‘best 
practice’ guidance to help bring consistency across licensing authorities.177 For instance, it 
clarifies the legal possibility for local authorities to set quantity restrictions on taxi licenses 
                                               
168 The decision is accessible at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions/mr-m-lange-and-others-v-
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https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/taxi-and-private-hire-vehicle-licensing-best-practice-guidance . 
 22 
outside London,178 emphasizing that this is only possible when no significant demand is 
unmet and that this may need to be demonstrated in court if the local authority’s decision is 
challenged.179 However since a Office of Fair Trading report issued in 2003,180 few local 
authorities set quantitative limits to taxi and PH drivers licenses in England and even when 
they have done so, judicial control is open: licensing authorities then have to prove that there 
is no significant demand for the services of hackney carriages in the area which is unmet.181  
Although this contribution focuses on the situation in London, the diversity of positions of 
transport authorities in other parts of the United Kingdom deserve some attention. Indeed, 
Uber is required under the Local Government Act 1976 to be licensed in the same local area  
where its drivers and fleet are licensed to operate and despatch them.182 However, Uber’s 
licensing process has not been without struggles or opposition outside of London. For 
instance, in Edinburgh183 and Glasgow184 (Scotland), Uber is fully licensed despite calls for 
policy change by competing operators. The City Council of Cambridge is currently reviewing 
Uber’s licence renewal application,185 while Brighton City Council considered that it could 
only deliver a six-month license, pending further requests for information.186 Sheffield City 
Council threatened to suspend – for purely administrative errors - Uber’s licence.187 Besides 
these hurdles, Uber failed twice to renew its license in 2017 outside of London.  
 
The town of Swansea (Wales) refused on 8th September 2017 to renew Uber’s license 
because Uber refused to set structured shifts for its drivers.188 Uber enjoys there a loophole 
however, as the close cities of Cardiff and Newport have licensed Uber. In the name of free 
movement, Uber continues its activities in Swansea with licenses for its drivers and vehicles 
from these two neighbouring cities.189 Indeed, only one requirement exists as to the territorial 
scope of taxi and PH licensing: the driver, the vehicle and the despatcher/operator need to 
receive the licence from the same entity. Pre-booked journeys can however start and finish 
outside the licencing entity without any limits, a problem well known in London as well.190  
On 12th December 2017, the City Council of York (England) had also to decide whether Uber 
was a “fit and proper business” that was worthy of being awarded a licence.191 In order to 
renew the licence, the City Council needed to assess Uber’s business practices. Accordingly, 
they could either fully accept the application, grant the licence on a temporary basis or refuse 
it. After long discussions, the Council decided that the data breach and the large number of 
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complaints received against Uber constituted specific motives justifying a refusal of the 
renewal.192 Besides, during the discussions, the Councillors argued that the impossible 
physical interaction with Uber staff, the lack of standards of the service provided (e.g. the 
lack of knowledge of the drivers and of the town) as well as the overall waiving of liability 
for the transport service offered meant an overarching lack of confidence in the operator. One 
important point which could not be considered in the final decision was the high level of 
complaints against drivers licensed in other towns and having activities in York.193 Uber 
decided to appeal the refusal.194 
 
V. Pending responses to digital innovation in England  
 
The previous sections have discussed the battle between licensing authorities, as keeper of 
public safety (such as TfL) and the bearers of innovative technologies and business models 
(such as Uber). However, a range of further legal changes are under consideration.  
 
Overarching legal changes. The Law Commission has made a range of recommendations in 
relation to the taxi and PH sector.195 Having gained new powers in relation to this matter, the 
Welsh government carried out in 2017 a consultation about reforming the system on the basis 
of the Law Commission recommendations.196 The outcome of this consultation remains to be 
decided at the time of writing. 
 
Changes for taxis. Uber’s supporters call for changes in the taxi regulation, especially in 
London. They seek to put licensed taxis and licensed PH drivers on a level playing field, 
giving them the same business opportunities (e.g. priority lanes).  
 
Addressing coordination issues. Uber’s opponents flag up two key issues: firstly, capping 
PH drivers’ licenses and secondly, cross-boundary transportation. Changes to grant the 
London Mayor powers to cap the number of PH drivers have been called by the All 
parliamentary group on taxis197 and the Mayor of London itself.198 When it comes to cross-
boundary issues (i.e. when one licensing authority license Uber as PH and not the bordering 
authority), this question is not really new. In a 2011 report, the issued had already been 
raised.199 However, digital platforms have given a new urgency to the matter. Now, 
London200 and the All party parliamentary group are calling for a national intervention on this 
matter. 
 
Changes related to the sharing economy. Digital innovation scholars pushed towards more 
participation to the sharing economy, especially under the influence of Rachel Botsman 
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(based in Oxford Saïd Business School). Under the liberal approach to innovation in England, 
the sharing economy needed few adjustments to develop, except in its dimension of the 
provision of services (rather than the sharing of goods) from one to another (often referred to 
as ‘the gig-economy’, the ‘on-demand’ digital economy, the ‘Mesh’). However, the social 
and economic impact of such innovation increases the scale of small phenomena which could 
evade legal regulation. The systemic risks created require to revisit the phenomenon from a 
legislative perspective to protect the weakest groups in the community. Hence, the need to 
promote the protection of gig-workers (as proposed in the Taylor Review) is increasingly 
expressed and broader changes related to the sharing economy are being discussed, including 
at Westminster.201  
 
VI. Flexible regulation as a response to changing mobility services  
 
Dating back from the mid-19th century, the regulatory framework applicable to taxis in 
London has adapted to the emergence of the PH industry in regulating it in 1998: two 
systems, taxis and PH, co-exist alongside each other. Their co-existence and complementarity 
was based on the fact that the two sectors had different features: immediate availability on 
street and taxi ranks, taximeters, deepened knowledge of the street intricacies in London for 
the taxi drivers on the one hand; no plying for hire but pre-booking for the PH sector on the 
other hand. The pillar of the regulation of each sector was similar: licences for vehicles and 
drivers in each case, with more demanding entry requirements for taxi drivers (in terms of 
knowledge and investment) and a licence for PH operators. The main test to be passed was 
the test of being a “fit and proper person” to be licensed. No quantitative limits to licences 
exist in London for neither industry. The major concern behind these two regulatory systems 
is to ensure the safety of the public first and foremost. 
 
Digital technology is challenging the basic premises of this two-tier system as digital tools 
render detailed personal knowledge of the street system in London less crucial (according to 
some at least) and direct bookings and algorithms may become the new electronic hailing 
systems and electronic taximeters. This means that digital technology might render the 
distinction between two different industries and two different regulatory systems obsolete. 
 
However digital technology does not happen in a void. Other changes or pressures are also 
increasingly present in regulators’ mind. London is especially facing specific challenges: first 
congestion and traffic jam; secondly, poor air quality; thirdly, an ever growing need to be an 
inclusive society ensuring that disabled people can share in the general social life; fourthly, 
security threat and the need to monitor illegal work. This leads London authorities to develop 
a policy where cars (any cars: personal cars, taxis and PH services) are not necessarily seen 
only as positive assets that contribute to helping people to move from one point to another. 
Cars are also part of major problems in the living together in London. The sharp increase of 
PH vehicles since 2012 can be regarded as contributing to this collective problem more than 
as providing for the personal comfort of individual users. Therefore, London authorities 
address cars as a private incursion making extensive use of the public space: they try to limit 
their numbers and their emissions, to develop an interconnected efficient network of public 
transport (even at night) and to foster a more holistic approach to transportation within a 
green city. All these contextual changes may lead to suggest that they transform the concept 
of physical transportation from one point to the other in the shortest time or journey into a 
more qualitative notion of mobility as a service with features relating to the immediate 
                                               
201 See e.g. Work and Pensions Committee, Self-employment and the gig economy (2016-17 HC 847). 
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beneficiary of the service as well as the community where this service is delivered. The 
regulatory changes which are currently made and discussed in London and in England do not 
back up entirely this suggestion yet as many aspects are still under discussion.202 However, a 
quick recap of the regulatory changes carried out in relation to Uber so far shows that little 
has changed when it comes to the structuration of the regulatory system. What has changed 
belongs to the remit of tweaking.  
 
Firstly, changes have been mostly introduced in the conditions set for licensing PH operators 
and drivers (especially the English language) in London. Other changes such as the 
topographic test for PH drivers built on conditions that existed previously but the system has 
been adapted to make it less prone to abuse. The most far reaching changes in the licensing of 
PH operators in London relates to the dramatic increase of the licensing fees for large fleets 
of vehicles (from the previous £2,836 to the current £2,900,000). However, this is not a 
regulatory change but a mere financial adaptation to the market changes and its financial 
implication in terms of monitoring compliance. Furthermore, inside and outside London, 
licensing authorities have always enjoyed a wide discretion in carrying out the 
trustworthiness and reliability test of the “fit and proper person” and to attach conditions to 
licences, conditions that are required by local circumstances. This licensing principle did not 
change. The modalities that the licensing authorities give to this test may be adapting, 
responding to the changes in the context within which they have to make their licensing 
decisions however. 
 
Secondly, indirect changes may bear a loose relationship with Uber. At a social level, strict 
requirements in terms of wheelchair access or strict emphasis on a general policy geared 
towards green mobility have a long history in England. At a technological level, the 
strengthening of data protection had been on the agenda for a long time, and Uber 
misbehaviour only confirmed the emergency in updating the right to privacy for the digital 
age. These requirements may constraint the development of Uber or at least channel some 
parts of its services, but need to be assessed in their wider context than merely as spurred by 
Uber.  
 
Thirdly, judges side-lined the impact of technology on the law while duly considering the 
economic and social impact of changing behaviours. On the one hand, English judges did not 
fear to eliminate from arguments submitted to them the narrative that the technological 
development should be protected for the sake of innovation. On the other hand, judges stood 
up for the examination of the economic relationship between providers and the platform in 
Aslam v. Uber (favouring workers), the social relationship between users and the platform in 
TfL and Uber v. LTDA/LPHCA (favouring Uber) and balanced the public interest in R. 
(Uber) v. TfL (by limiting the ‘hotline requirement’ (favouring Uber / keeping the ‘public 
interest’ focused on ‘emergencies’) but upholding the ‘language requirement’ (disfavouring 
Uber and Uber drivers / favouring the public interest). In a nutshell, the judges have a 
technology-neutral approach when applying the law to the activities that Uber carries. 
 
Overall therefore, mobility in a large city like London is a collective good that has been so far 
regulated by public authorities, taking increasingly into account a more holistic approach of 
the factors pertaining to devising such a mobility policy. TfL is setting key standards of 
safety for the public, reliability of taximeters, environmental friendly vehicles, all pointing 
                                               
202 See e.g. the pending inquiry in the HC on Mobility as a Service inquiry 
(https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/mobility-as-a-service-17-19/). 
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towards a qualitative way of living. TfL sets the regulatory framework and the trend. It does 
that in including a wide range of actors in its regular consultations on all sides of its mobility 
policy. With this in mind, PH operators have to seek to align their own practices and own 
standards that they seek to enforce on their drivers. For instance, the ‘fit and proper person’ 
test has been delegated to PH operators, while kept within the authority of TfL when 
assessing the good character of taxi drivers. This creates risks of discrepancies. Is Uber staff 
going to assess each driver individually? Or is an algorithm going to do so? In any case, the 
standard could either be very lax or could integrate very specific features to assess the 
“mental” or “physical” ability of its driver. Is the behaviour of an (occasional) driver who 
refuses too many journeys, who has a poor rating, who participates in collective actions of 
boycott against the low level of protection offered by Uber or who is not active enough be 
used against him/her to consider him “unfit” for the job? Or is this criterion assessed only 
from a purely economic standpoint of efficiency of the driver to bring customers from a point 
A to a point B with the most profit? Under the assessment delegation, much leeway is left to 
the platform or the PH operator. Each action undertaken by the driver is appraised. 
Delegating so much power could backlash against the drivers if too strict or against 
customers if too lax. Although the incentive to adapt to the same standard as TfL uses is high, 
the temptation to punish drivers who are multihoming or expressing concerns about the 
functioning of the platform could be high. This draws the attention on the censorship power 
of the PH operators on the service providers. The stakes in this debate are similar to the 
private censorship power of Internet intermediaries complying with duties to eliminate hate 
speech or material infringing copyrights uploaded onto their servers: the platform also has 
also a wide incentive to disrespect the freedom of expression of its users.203 
 
Therefore, the debate on the development of mobility as a service is not one of PH services as 
full substitute to taxis or the ability for individual users to choose which among taxis or PH 
services better fit their preferences or needs. The main battle that is illustrated with the advent 
of Uber in London bears on the political, economic and legal arguments to be made in favour 
of public or private regulation when it comes to decide the quality of life in a city, including 
the mobility it offers to its residents and visitors. The question is not whether digital 
innovation disrupts social practices but how digital innovation may be best used to serve the 
complex socio-economic and environmental challenges London faces. Can we trust the 
holder of digital innovation to make this use in the interest of the collectivity, through private 
regulation and from a location very little connected to the place where the effects of their 
regulation are felt on the ground? Or do we trust the regulatory authority that has an historical 
memory of the city, its specificities, embedded natural rhythms and peculiarities? Or should 
we entrust the community itself by empowering citizens to make use of the technology to 
express their will in the legislative process (at the expense of a long-standing tradition of 
political compromise) and to enforce their choice by a wider scope of action under private 
enforcement regimes (at the expense of the right to non-discrimination)? To answer these 
questions, mobility as a service will require a smart balancing of public and private regulation 
in the years to come!  
                                               
203 See e.g. D. Koukiadis, Reconstruting Internet normativity: the role of state, private actors, global online 
community in the production of legal norms, Germany, Hart-Nomos, 2015, pp. 91-99; T.J. McIntyre and C. 
Scott, “Internet Filtering: Rhetoric, Legitimacy, Accountability and Responsibility”, in R. Brownsword and K. 
Yeung (eds.), in Regulating Technologies, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008, pp. 109-125. 
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VII. Appendix  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of 2017 taxi and private hire vehicle licensing figures compared with 
2015 
 
 
 
Source: National Statistics, Taxi and private hire vehicles statistics, England: 2017 report204 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Summary of 2015 taxi and private hire verhicle licensing figures compared 
with 2013 
 
 
Source: National Statistics, Taxi and private hire vehicles statistics, England: 2015 report205 
 
 
                                               
204 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/taxi-and-private-hire-vehicles-statistics-england-2017. 
205 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/taxi-and-private-hire-vehicles-statistics-england-2015.  
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Table 3: Licensed PHV and Hackney carriage (HC) Drivers in London (2009-17) 
 
 
 
Source: House of Lords, Gig Economy: Introduction, 21 November 2017 
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